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INTRODUCTION
privatization of state-owned and administered agencies
because of the alleged greater efficiency of private
firms. It is, therefore, timely to ask whether private
water companies may be an efficient alternative to
public firms. But first I must be explicit about what I
mean by “economic efficiency.”

Much apprehension exists as to whether our water
supplies will be adequate to meet ever-increasing
demands from household, municipal, industrial,
agricultural, and recreational users. Few believe that
opportunities for new water development are either
economically or politically feasible. More attention
must be given, therefore, to greater efficiency in water
allocation in order to “stretch” existing supplies, and
this may require institutional and policy modifications.
An important issue is whether private or public
companies can distribute water more efficiently to
consumers, and this paper will address this question.

WHAT IS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY?
Economic efficiency is the term used to describe the
allocation of society's resources in a way which
maximizes net economic product. At the firm level, this
outcome is identical with the maximization of net
income (revenues from output sales minus the sum of
all costs incurred). Efficiency is also sometimes defined
as cost minimization when the best technology is
utilized. Usually high per capita net incomes are very
closely correlated with high standards of living, so all of
us have a large stake in an efficient allocation of
resources.

Lying behind all discussions of water policy are
philosophical beliefs and traditions. To most people
water is a “social” resource that is owned by the people,
and this view is explicitly stated in the constitutions of
most Western states. Water users obtain entitlement to
use it through usufructuary rights, created and governed
by state agencies. Still, at the retail level both public
agencies and private companies are permitted to
distribute water to final consumers, much like any other
commodity. A water publication in 1980 indicated that
at that time approximately 50,000 domestic systems
sold water to more than 200,000,000 people in the
United States (Water Utility Management, 1980, p. 1).
Forty-four percent of these companies were publicly
owned and managed and they served about 80 percent
of the population.

Applied to water, economic efficiency has both spatial
and temporal dimensions. In terms of spatial allocation,
efficiency requires that water be allocated among
current users such that the net value of the water at the
margin is equal for every user. For example, if water is
valued at $100 per acre-foot at the margin in use A and
at $110 in use B, and the cost of moving it from A to B
is $10 per acre-foot, then an efficient allocation has
been achieved. Moving the last unit of water to B
created a net benefit of $100, exactly the same net
benefit as the marginal value in use A. Spatial
economic efficiency in water allocation has been
achieved as between use A and use B since no
reallocation could generate greater economic product.

Are the public or the private water companies more
efficient in delivering water to consumers? More
empirical studies are needed to more definitively answer
this question.
And do these private and public
companies compete on a level playing field as far as the
regulatory environment is concerned? Perhaps the
principal point of this paper is that various
discriminatory practices and policies have been erected
to promote public water companies. At the same time,
however, in the United States and in many other
countries, much attention has recently been given to

Optimal temporal allocative efficiency for water that
may be stored and used in the future requires that the
discounted present marginal values of water for use in
the present and in all future time periods be equal. For
example, if the marginal value of water (net of
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numbered in the thousands. Hence, the incentive for
each individual owner to get involved in monitoring
efficiency is greatly diminished. He will bear the costs
of his efforts himself, but will share the benefits with all
of the other equity owners. This situation is an example
of the “free-rider” problem that exists in all forms of
collective action, whether private or public. If the freerider problem is potentially serious, however,
monitoring of efficiency may be transferred by the
owners to an agent who will be hired to do the job. But
this may lead to another generic difficulty called the
“principal-agent” problem, wherein the agent has an
incentive to act in his own interest rather than that of the
principal and must himself be carefully monitored.
Devices such as bonding the agent and limiting his
discretion by minute contract specification may be used
to reduce the principal-agent problem.

evaporation) in a reservoir has a current use value of
$100 per acre-foot and the expected present value of use
five years from now is $200 per acre-foot after
allowances for storage and risk costs, there is temporal
misallocation. Use of water in the present should be
curtailed and saved for future use when the value is
higher.
DIFFERENT INCENTIVES DRIVE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE DECISIONS IN WATER
DISTRIBUTION
There are basically two types of private water suppliers:
investor-owned and mutually-owned companies. The
former may sell stock to the public, but most frequently
are the property of a developer or an individual owner.
These companies operate for profit just as does any
private firm competing for capital, labor, and land.
However, like electric utilities, these firms most often
operate in what is considered to be a natural monopoly
market, and thus are regulated by several state agencies
(the most important in most states is a Public Service
Commission).

Still, despite these problems in private firms, I would
argue that in capitalistic societies private firms have
been highly successful in monitoring efficiency and thus
have provided goods and services at minimum cost that
consumers desire.
Unfortunately, government (public) firms and agencies
have no such incentives to produce efficiently. There
are many reasons. I do not question the integrity or
quality of individuals who serve us in public
institutions. They behave rationally as would any of us
in a similar environment. But investment and operating
capital are not acquired in competitive capital markets.
Capital is generally provided through government
appropriations as well as revenues from user fees. But
almost always prices are set by administrative fiat and
become highly politicized. This is why nearly all public
firms distributing mail, transportation, electricity, water,
and sewerage services are subsidized in one form or
another.
In addition, there is even a perverse
relationship between price and cost. Higher costs are
used to justify higher prices. And, unlike a private firm
competing for capital, a public firm, at best, has only
weak incentives to reduce costs. In fact, in most
bureaucracies, the larger the budget of the agency, the
greater the political power of the agency and the greater
the status of the agency’s administrators.

Mutually-owned companies do not operate for profit per
se, and are usually not regulated. Instead, because the
system users are also the mutual owners, rewards to
efficiency are returned to the users in the form of low
water rates. Because of their ownership structure,
however, mutually-owned companies tend to have
management problems that have the potential for
decreasing efficiency. Why is this so?
The ownership structure of a company determines the
incentives for efficient management. Economists have
captured the essence of this issue in the notion of the
“residual claimant.” The owners of a for-profit firm
have the residual claim on profits, and are therefore
motivated strongly to monitor the management of the
firm. Because their wealth is at stake, they have an
incentive to minimize shirking by the employees of the
firm and other practices that reduce efficiency. Unless
the owners of the firm earn a competitive rate of return,
they will withdraw their capital and place it elsewhere
where returns are higher. In short, the survival of the
firm is at risk. Competition for resources is a harsh
taskmaster and furnishes a tremendously strong
incentive for efficiency, cost minimization, and dynamic
innovations that are expected to improve the
competitive position of the firm.

Over the past two decades the public choice school has
contributed greatly to our understanding of the failure of
governmental agencies to produce public services
efficiently (Anderson, 1983). Three main concerns are:
1) imperfect information and voter ignorance, 2)
concentrated benefits and diffused costs, and 3) shortsightedness of political decisions.

I do not mean to infer that private firms do not have
problems that dissipate efficiency. If the firm is owned
by many individuals, such as is the case with most
corporations that issue stock to the public, the residual
returns are spread across multiple owners, often

For individual citizens, relevant information on public
decisions is complex and costly to obtain. And because
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The conclusion of this section is that economic theory
strongly suggests that private water companies should
have efficiency advantages over public companies.
How might this be tested empirically? One approach
would be to observe if private firms offer water to
similar consumers at lower prices than public firms do.
This would imply that private companies have lower
costs and are, therefore, more efficient.

an individual voter’s “voice” in the voting booth is so
very small as a fraction of all votes, voters do not find it
rational to acquire the information to make really
informed decisions on candidates and issues. In other
words, they remain “rationally ignorant.” This implies
that their votes may not reflect a full cognizance of full
societal benefits and costs. To the contrary, when they
use their own resources to make purchases in the market
they are motivated to acquire the optimal amount of
information. In addition, when voters vote for a
candidate, they seldom can take a little of this and a
little of that — rather, they elect a bundle of programs
and policies favored by the candidate. Therefore,
citizens may not get from public action exactly what
they would opt for if the choice were theirs alone to
make, or if they could elect one issue at a time. The
result is an inefficient match between the outcomes of
political decisions and what an individual citizen may
really desire.

SOME EMPIRICAL COMPARISONS OF
EFFICIENCY IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
WATER FIRMS
In 1993 a student at Brigham Young University and I
studied the water rates and policies of two private and
two public water companies operating in the Salt Lake
Valley of Utah (Hawkins, 1993). One of the objectives
of the study was to determine if public policy
discriminated against the private companies and thus
might account for the small number that then existed.

Besides, it is well known that small numbers of citizens
acting in concert who have large and concentrated
benefits at stake in political decisions will expend
tremendous effort and expense to “persuade” the
politicians to grant the political favors that they desire.
This is accomplished by contributions to political
campaigns and other forms of “politicking.” On the
other hand, the majority of taxpayers who must pay for
political favors given to the concentrated beneficiaries
generally have only a small individual stake in the
political action and, therefore, exert little political effort
to block the transfer. The ultimate consequence is that
the process granting political favors is likely to be
skewed and dominated by special and concentrated
interests, and hardly efficient from the viewpoint of the
electorate as a whole.

White City Water was an investor-owned company at
the time of the study while the Holliday Water
Company was the largest mutually-owned private water
system in Utah. It is of some relevance that White City
Water has since been converted into a public entity —
the White City Water Improvement District with all the
usual powers of a public district such as power to tax if
the taxpayers approve. This action in itself says
something about the competitive abilities of purely
private investor-owned companies in the water field in
Utah.
Holliday Water was established as a mutually-owned
company in the late nineteenth century, and in 1990
delivered water to 3,751 consumers in the southern part
of Salt Lake City. White City Water obtained water
rights and established a water delivery system in the
1940s to assist homebuyers in obtaining Federal Home
Administration and Veteran’s Administration loans. It
operated south of Salt Lake City in the area that is now
Sandy City, and in 1990 provided water to over 3,600
connections. At the time of the study about 50 percent
of the ownership control was held by one individual.
Sandy City Water was and is a municipal public utility
that sold water to over 20,000 connections in 1990. In
fact, Sandy City now completely surrounds the private
Holliday Water system.

Finally, there is the “short-sightedness” effect. Because
politicians must face the electorate every few years,
they tend to be more concerned with programs and
policies that emphasize short-term effects, rather than
on long-term consequences. This contrasts with private
market
decisions
where
wealth-maximizing
entrepreneurs look to the long-term future in making
optimal investment decisions.
Terry Anderson (1983) concludes: “Given these
characteristics of the political sector, the economics of
public choice suggest that the information and incentive
structure is likely to generate government failure.
Efficiency in government is not apt to occur unless the
incentive structure faced by governmental decision
makers is altered to conform more closely to that
described by the property rights paradigm.”

Salt Lake City Water incorporated as a public company
in 1876 and by 1990 had grown to over 80,000
connections. It sells water to Salt Lake City and a few
surrounding communities. It is a typically large and
public municipal water delivery company.
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Table 1: Tariff Comparisons for Four Utah Water Companies; 1993
Company Name

Holliday

Minimum Fee ($)/
Water Allowance
(gals.)
3.00/5,900

Excess Water Cost
($/1,000 gals.)

Hookup Fee ($)

0.40

970.00

8.00/6,000

0.52

950.00

8.85/6,000
11.94/6,000
16.45/6,000

0.54
0.54
0.68

1,170.00
1,626.00
2,129.00

6.45/7,480
8.95/7,480

0.58
0.86

970.00
1,092.00

White City
Sandy City
In city limits
Union/Jordan
County service
Salt Lake City
In city limits
County service
Source: Hawkins (1993).

Public Service Commission/Department of Public
Services (PSC/DPU), 2) the State Engineer’s office,
3) state policy providing subsidized financing for
public water utilities, and 4) different taxation
policies facing private and public water companies.

Table 1 gives the 1990 rate structure for these four
companies.
The data show that the private
companies supplied water at lower rates than did
the public ones. Holliday had the lowest rates for
the first 5,900 gallons used, and thereafter on larger
blocks of water. In fact, the marginal rates on the
excess water over the minimum allowance were
lower for both of the private than for the public
companies. These data also indicate that both of
the public companies delivered water to their own
residents at far cheaper rates than were paid by their
customers living outside the city limits. (This is
also a characteristic of public companies and raises
a host of efficiency and equity questions that are
beyond the scope of this paper.)

The Utah State Code allows water utilities
operating under the PSC of Utah to recover the cost
of investment in depreciable utility plants by
changing rates collected from consumers. White
City Water, an investor-owned for-profit company,
was regulated by the PSC whereas Holliday Water
as a mutually-owned company was not. This fact
alone may explain why Holliday’s rates were far
lower than the other three. White City Water had to
bear the legal and administrative costs of
petitioning the PSC/DUP for rate increases to cover
depreciation and other costs. We have no precise
estimate of these costs in this case, but all regulated
public utilities know that they are significant.
There can be little question that a competitive rate
of return on the firm’s assets could be obtained with
lower water rates were it not for this regulatory
burden.

Of course, the value of water may also be
influenced by the reliability of delivery and the
quality of water. Are there differences among these
companies in these respects? The answer seems to
be negative, since no serious complaints in recent
years were registered with the Public Service
Commission by water users from any of the four
systems.

The State Engineer (SE), the agency in Utah which
supervises water rights and proposals for changes in
water diversions, takes a much more restrictive
stance against private companies than public
companies in allowing water acquisitions and
changes of use of water in accordance with
projected demands. The problem is that in states
where prior appropriation law is used to allocate
water, beneficial use must be demonstrated to the
state regulatory body.
“Public entities can
distribute water to a variety of uses at their own

DISCRIMINATORY REGULATION
AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPANIES
No efficiency comparisons between private and
public water companies would be meaningful
without analysis of the differences that confront
them in the regulatory environment. Indeed, it will
be shown that the explicit discrimination against the
private companies has been so severe in Utah that it
is a wonder that even one still exists.
Discrimination exists in the following areas: 1) the
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by the fact that in 1991, White City Water paid
$12,578 in property taxes, $2,171 in utility
regulatory assessment fees, $59,327 in federal
income taxes, and $10,267 in state income taxes,
while none of these taxes were borne by the public
water utilities. This amounted to $23.43 per
connection per year, not an inconsiderable financial
burden. If a private firm pays these taxes, and its
prices to consumers are lower than those of the
public firms, and if prices cover costs in the long
run, then it follows that other costs of the private
firms must be lower than those of the public firms.

discretion under their corporate right while private
companies must provide greater definition and
more detailed proof in justification of each kind of
use” (Bagley and Haws 1985, p. 10). Moreover,
public entities enjoy substantially more latitude in
acquiring and holding water rights in expectation of
future needs than do private firms. In other words, a
public company anticipating increases in water
demand can argue that this demand is “beneficial
use” more successfully than can a private company.
Part of the reasoning for the SE’s rigid standard of
beneficial use for private water companies is the
underlying bureaucratic conviction that the state
should not furnish its resources for purposes that
are not strictly “public” in nature. Hence, the
public should not be involuntarily committed
through the taxing powers of the state to underwrite
private ventures that generate private benefits to
their owners. The effect of this position is that the
SE is actually blocking the transfer of water rights
from public to private firms, even when analysis
demonstrates that the private users value the water
at higher levels.
Another difference in the environments of private
and public companies is in the financing of capital
projects. The State of Utah has appropriated funds
that are loaned to water companies at below market
rates of interest. In fact, in some cases of perceived
hardship, interest charges may be waived entirely.
The authority to grant low-interest loans rests with
the Division of Water Resources (DWR). DWR
holds to the position that public water companies
should be favored in the granting of loans, and that
taxpayer money should not be allowed to contribute
to a “private” purpose. In fact, no large private
water company has been the recipient of a DWR
loan in recent history. Therefore, the Cities Water
Loan Fund administered by DWR, is designated
strictly for public companies. Private companies,
on the other hand, must obtain funds from the
capital market where risk is an important
component of the interest rate that the company is
required to pay. Furthermore, obtaining market
loans may be difficult for private water companies
because only system capital can serve as collateral.
Since water companies are capital intensive, like
other utilities, this kind of discrimination in favor of
the public companies can make a huge difference in
whether the private companies can be competitive.

CONCLUSIONS
Despite explicit discrimination against private
water companies in several ways, our evidence
suggests that the rates of the private companies
were lower than those of public companies that
served the same classes of consumers in similar
geographical locations.
Public choice theory
predicts that private companies will be more
efficient than public ones because of incentives that
contribute to efficiency. So the theory is supported
by the data. But much more empirical testing needs
to be done in Utah and elsewhere. What seems to
be quite clear is that economic efficiency would be
served and lower rates would ensue if public policy
ceased discriminating against the private companies
in order to allow them to compete on a level
playing field. The SE’s office should apply the
same standards to private companies obtaining
water rights and desiring water transfers as are
applied to public companies. State-subsidized
financing to public companies should cease. But if
this is politically infeasible, then economic
efficiency would be enhanced if the same subsidies
were offered to private companies. State and
federal taxes should be uniformly applied to private
and public water companies, and to investor-owned
and to mutually-owned firms.
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Finally, public and private companies are taxed
differently.
Investor-owned private water
companies are subject to property and income taxes
and mutually-owned companies are subject to
property taxes, whereas public water companies are
not taxed at all. This can be important as illustrated
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